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Abstract 
 
This paper provides a cross-country perspective to the firm-level analysis of the relation between 
foreign ownership and labour demand. We estimate labour demand equations in eleven European 
countries using dynamic panel data techniques on samples that permit to distinguish the ownership 
status of firms. We find that the employment adjustment is significantly faster in MNEs’ affiliates, 
irrespective of the country investigated. As for the wage elasticity of labour demand, MNEs show 
smaller elasticities compared with national firms, and very little variation across countries. Cross-
country correlations show that the relative value of wage elasticities in MNEs on that in NEs is 
positively related to country-level indexes of  labour market regulation (employment protection, union 
presence,...). We interpret the results as follows. MNEs tend to have a more rigid demand for total 
labour (possibly due to a different skill composition). However, being MNEs relatively “footloose”, this 
difference tends to vanish as the rigidity of employment regulations rises. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This paper addresses one particular aspect of the globalisation-labour market nexus, namely the 
implications of inward FDIs activity on the characteristics of labour demand in host countries. FDI 
flows directed to developed economies, mainly in the form of mergers and acquisitions, have been 
growing at an accelerated pace throughout the past decade (see, e.g., UNCTAD (1999), Lipsey (2000), 
Shatz and Venables (2001)). Especially in the case of European countries, a substantial share of 
productive activities currently falls under foreign control.1 Policy makers and economic actors 
participate to this tendency with mixed feelings. On the one hand, inward FDIs are generally perceived 
to benefit domestic employment by increasing productivity in the owned plants and generating positive 
spillovers to local firms. On the other hand, because of the “footloose” nature of multinational firms, 
the concern is sometimes raised that employment downsizing in response to negative shocks would 
occur more easily in foreign-owned plants, so that inward FDIs would also be associated with higher 
job insecurity and reduced unions’ power.  
 
There are reasons to expect that multinational enterprises (henceforth MNEs) may adjust 
employment in their subsidiaries more easily and less costly than domestic firms (henceforth NEs). 
First of all, MNEs have the possibility of relocating employment across subsidiaries, and this helps to 
reduce costs related to firing and hiring personnel. Second, multinational firms may be able to bargain 
from a privileged position with (national or local) governments and unions, thus obtaining sometimes 
exceptions on hiring and firing practices.2 Moreover, being MNEs less committed towards the 
countries hosting their subsidiaries, they may be in a better position to resist the pressures coming by 
public authorities concerned with local employment conditions. The fact that a given establishment is 
owned by an MNE may have implications not only for the speed of employment adjustment but also 
for the magnitude of the adjustment in response to given shocks. In particular, this may matter in terms 
of wage elasticity. On the one hand, the overall labour demand in MNEs subsidiaries is likely to be 
more rigid, because characterized by a higher intensity of skilled labour, estimated to be less elastic to 
wages (see, e.g., Hamermesh (1993)).3 On the other hand, keeping equal the skill composition of labour 
                                                 
1 The inward FDI stock (as a percentage of GDP) was 11.1 in Western Europe in 1990 and 22.4 in 1999, while the same 
figures were 9.2 and 17.3 for the world average and 8.4 and 14.5 for developed countries on aggregate (UNCTAD (2001)). 
2There is evidence, for instance, that MNEs have managed in a number of countries to bargain wages at a more 
decentralized level compared with domestic firms (Katz (1993), Ehremberg (1994)). Moreover, in some countries and 
regions (e. g., export processing zones) less stringent hiring and firing rules have been granted to MNEs with the purpose of 
attracting FDI. For theoretical models of wage bargaining between unions and multinationals see Mezzetti and Dinopoulos 
(1991) and Zhao (1998). 
3 See also Markusen (2002) for a survey of stylised facts on MNEs and for theory and evidence on the relation between the 
multinational status and the skill composition of employment. 
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demand, the wage elasticity in MNEs’ subsidiaries is expected to be higher than that in purely national 
firms since MNEs have the option of relocating activities or shifting employment across countries in 
response to wage changes. This asymmetric position of MNEs as employers has a number of 
consequences for the countries hosting FDIs. First, the degree of labour turnover in the host country 
may increase as inward FDIs become more abundant. Second, there may be effects related with 
changes in the demand elasticity for particular skill categories. In particular, if demand for unskilled 
labour is more elastic in MNEs’ subsidiaries, union mark-ups may fall and a greater share of the wedge 
between labour costs and wages (payroll taxes,…) will be effectively paid by workers (see, e.g., Rodrik 
(1997) on this points). 
 
While the relation between foreign ownership, productivity and wages has been extensively 
investigated empirically, there is little work analysing the impact of inward FDI on labour demand 
adjustment and on the elasticity of labour demand.4 The aim of this paper is that of contributing to fill 
this gap by providing a cross-country perspective to the firm-level analysis of the relation between 
foreign ownership and labour demand. The paper focuses on the relation between foreign ownership 
and the characteristics of labour demand in given firms, while the effects on the pattern of firms’ 
shutdowns/openings are not investigated. In particular, we address the following questions: Is the 
adjustment of employment systematically faster in MNEs’ subsidiaries? Is there any significant 
difference in labour demand elasticities between national firms and MNEs’ affiliates? How does the 
different employment behaviour of MNEs relate with country-level labour market regulations?  
 
Our data set is an unbalanced panel covering more than ten thousand companies located in 
eleven European countries observed in the period 1993-2000. The source of our data is the “Amadeus” 
database collected by Bureau Van Dijk. We estimate firm-level, constant output labour demand 
equations separately in each country by means of Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimators for dynamic 
panel data. The ownership status of firms (foreign or national) is assumed to potentially affect the 
speed of technical progress, wage and output labour demand elasticities, and employment adjustment 
costs. 
 
Our estimates are largely supportive of the view that employment adjustment in foreign owned 
firms is faster than in purely domestic companies, after controlling for sector and size effects. 
Employment changes are in fact significantly less persistent for MNEs’ subsidiaries, and this is a feature 
that characterises all countries analysed. As for the wage elasticity of labour demand, there is clear 
                                                 
4 One of the few exceptions is Fabbri, Haskel and Slaughter (2002), who compare the evolution of labour demand 
elasticities for MNEs and national firms in the UK. 
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evidence that the long-run demand for labour is more rigid in MNEs’ affiliates. We interpret this result 
in the light of the different skill composition of labour demand in multinational firms.  
Finally, the cross-country pattern of wage elasticities in national establishments and MNEs’ 
subsidiaries is put in relation with country-level labour market regulation variables (mainly from OECD 
source). We find that while the long-run wage elasticity in foreign-owned plants has very little variation 
across countries, country-level characteristics seem to matter for the elasticity in domestic plants. In 
particular, the wage elasticity in national plants appears to be less elastic in countries with more 
regulated labour markets. We interpret this evidence by referring to the wider set of instruments 
available to MNEs to bypass “de-jure” or “de-facto” labour market regulations. This makes MNEs 
relatively less affected by country-level measures of labour market rigidity. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we survey the related 
empirical literature. In section 3 we present our empirical estimates, while in section 4 we correlate our 
estimates with alternative proxies for adjustment costs. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related literature 
 
A number of papers have analysed the relation of inward FDI with wage levels (among others, Lipsey 
(1994), Doms and Jensen (1996), and and Feliciano and Lipsey (1999)). A common finding is that, on 
average, MNEs’ subsidiaries in the US pay higher wages when compared with domestically owned 
establishments. Lipsey (1994) shows that the wage difference paid by MNEs becomes insignificant after 
controlling for firm size, while Feliciano and Lipsey (1999), limiting the analysis to manufacturing 
sectors, find that a wage premium in foreign-owned manufacturing establishments remains significant 
also after controlling for establishment, industry and state characteristics.5 The usual explanation for 
this wage premium paid in MNEs’ subsidiary is a productivity advantage in plants falling under foreign 
control (for empirical evidence see, e.g., Davies and Lyons (1991), Doms and Jensen (1998), Griffith 
(1999), Girma, Greenaway, and Wakelin (2002), and Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002)).6 Other work 
has instead concentrated the focus on the effects of inward FDI on wage inequality. Feenstra and 
Hanson (1997) and Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey (1996) show that inward FDI in Mexico have 
contributed to raise the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers significantly. Conversely, 
                                                 
5 Similar results are obtained in Globerman, Ries and Vertinsky (1994) for Canada, in Girma, Greenaway and Wakelin 
(2001) for the UK and in Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey (1996), who compare the experience of the US, Mexico and 
Venezuela. 
6 An alternative explanation maybe higher firm-level profitability for MNEs coupled with international profit sharing (Budd, 
Konings and Slaughter (2002)). 
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Blonigen and Slaughter (1999) do not find an effect on skill upgrading associated with inward FDIs in 
the US.  
 
The effects of FDI on demand elasticities and employment volatility have been analysed from 
different corners and following alternative methodologies. Some studies investigate the degree of 
substitutability of employment in MNEs’ plants located in different countries. Brainard and Riker 
(1997a), using firm-level data on US multinationals find that the degree of substitution between 
employment in parent companies in the US and in foreign affiliates is low. However, the same authors 
show that substitution between employment in subsidiaries in alternative low wage locations is quite 
strong (Brainard and Riker, 1997b). Bruno and Falzoni (1999), use sector-level data for the US to 
estimate dynamic factor demand equations in MNEs. They show that the substitution effects for 
employment across subsidiaries are limited to the short run, while in the long run complementarity 
effects tend to prevail. Brakonier and Ekholm (2000) look at firm-level data on Swedish multinationals 
and find that there is some evidence of substitution between employment in parent companies and 
employment in subsidiaries located in high-income countries, but not in those in low-income 
countries.7 Finally, Konings and Murphy (2001) use firm-level data on multinational firms of all EU 
countries. The authors find a substitution relationship between employment in parent companies and in 
subsidiaries, which is significant especially in the case of affiliates located within the EU. 
 
Other papers analyse directly the impact of “globalisation” measures on labour demand elasticities. 
Most of this work limits the analysis to the effects of international trade. Results show in general little 
relation between trade integration and labour demand elasticities (Slaughter (2001), Bruno, Falzoni, and 
Helg (2001), Fanlzylber and Maloney (2000), Krishna, Mitra, and Chinoy (2001)).8 To our knowledge, 
Fabbri, Haskel and Slaughter (2002) is the only paper providing a comparison of the elasticity of labour 
demand in national and multinational firms. They estimate plant-level demand equations for production 
and non-production labour in the UK. Their results show that over time the wage elasticity of demand 
for production labour has been rising faster in plants belonging to MNEs. 
The footloose nature of MNEs has been investigated with a more direct approach in Gorg and 
Strobl (2002), who look at inward FDI in Ireland. In this paper, using a Cox proportional hazard 
model, it is analysed whether, controlling for other plant and industry-specific characteristics, there is a 
significant difference between the survival rate of domestic and foreign-owned plants, and whether 
employment changes in MNEs are more or less persistent than those occurring in domestic plants. 
                                                 
7 A substitution relationship between parent and affiliate employment for Swedish MNEs is also found in Hatzius (1998). In 
this paper, however, there is no distinction between the locations of the subsidiaries. 
8 However, in Faini et. al. (1999) it is found a positive rank correlation across Italian manufacturing sectors between the 
values of labour demand elasticities and the share of employment in foreign subsidiaries.  
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Results show that multinationals are more likely to shut down operations, that job creation in foreign-
owned plants tend to be more persistent, while there is no significant difference between persistence of 
job destruction in foreign or domestic plants. A similar result concerning the likelihood of plant 
shutdowns is found in Fabbri, Haskel and Slaughter (2002) in their work on the UK. Plants belonging 
to MNEs are more likely to be shut down than domestic plants, conditional on a set of plant and 
industry characteristics. 
 
 
3. The empirical analysis 
 
 
3.1. Description of the data 
 
The aim of this section is to compare labour demands in MNEs’ affiliates and in national firms 
(henceforth NEs) in a sample that allows to analyse separately eleven European countries (Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom).9 The source of the data is the Amadeus database, a commercial database collected by 
Bureau Van Dijk that reports balance sheet and other information for about 5 million firms in 31 
countries between 1993 and 2000. This is the only data set for which it is possible to carry out cross-
country analyses comparing NEs and MNEs.10  We restrict our analysis to manufacturing firms in the 
eleven sample countries that reported ownership status. From these we exclude firms with less than 50 
employees and/or with less than three observations for the employment variable.11 The final total 
number of firms used is 14,900. Their distribution by country is reported in Table 1.  
                                                 
9. These are the countries for which a sufficiently high number of firms reporting ownership status was available.  
10 According to Amadeus dataset, a foreign firm is such when its ‘ultimate owner’ is non-resident in the country analysed. 
An ultimate owner can be a company, a public authority, a state, a mutual fund, a pension fund, a nominee, a trust or a 
trustee that owns at least 50% of the company. This information on the ownership status is not as accurate as we would 
have liked. First, it is time invariant, as the database does not report this information by year. As a consequence, for all the 
period, we classify as MNEs the firms which are foreign-owned in 2000. Second, information on the outward activities of 
firms is often missing, so that it is not possible to distinguish between national firms with or without foreign subsidiaries: 
Third, there is no information on firms’ closure, as the data set only reports information on firms which were active in 2000. 
11 Data for firms with less than 50 employees are quite often not reliable, when not missing altogether.  
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Table 1. The data set: summary statistics (reference year: 1998) 
 
 Belgium Denmark Spain Finland France Germany Italy Nether- 
lands 
Norway Sweden United Kingdom
N. of firmsa 586 233 1039 167 3273 323 1783 234 1079 1859 4324 
Of which MNEs (%) 65.02 48.07 40.52 31.14 38.41 46.13 27.26 73.93 14.64 13.56 47.29 
Total Employment 194.360 54.675 250.757 36.242 910.055 476.341 295.098 292.107 53.141 300.446 1.514.182
Of which in MNEs (%) 85.10 41.62 55.67 24.15 33.19 44.38 49.05 58.97 34.50 27.32 45.01 
Employees in the sample 
as % of  total national 
manufacturing 
employment b  
29.67 12.17 9.08 8.20 24.03 5.87 5.68 27.22 - 40.33 33.78 
For comparison: 
manufacturing 
employment  in foreign 
MNEs as reported by 
OECD statisticsc  
n.a. n.a. n.a. 13.80 27.80 6.00 8.8 21.90 17.40 21.80 17.80 
 
Notes: 
a The firms in the sample are in manufacturing and larger than 50 employees 
b Source OECD STAN database, OECD , 2001  
c OECD (2001), Measuring Globalisation, Volume I: Manufacturing Sector, OECD Paris, 2001 
 
 
The coverage of the final data set of national manufacturing activities varies by country, from 
40.33% in Sweden to 5.68% in Italy. Also, MNEs are over-represented compared to their share in 
national manufacturing employment, mainly because of the exclusion of firms smaller than 50 
employees. However, average output per employee and average cost of employment per employee for 
NEs and MNEs in the sample (Table A1) are in line with those at the population level, according to 
OECD data. Consistently with most of the available evidence, MNEs in the sample report higher 
output per employee and employment costs per employee than NEs. This gap, which is robust when 
we control for size and sector distribution (unreported), is possibly related to higher skill intensity in 
MNEs. Regrettably, in our sample we cannot directly measure this effect, as we have no information on 
the skill composition of employment.  
 
 
3.2. The econometric model and results 
 
We are interested in measuring both the speed and the extent of labour demand adjustment across firms. 
We derive from a Cobb Douglas production function a constant-output dynamic labour demand 
function for a generic cost-minimising firm under the assumption of partial adjustment of the type  
λ



=
−− 1
*
1 it
it
it
it
L
L
L
L
, where  10 ≤≤ λ , while itL  and *itL are, respectively, effective and desired employment 
in firm i at time t. In logarithmic form, the firm-level conditional labour demand is derived as follows, 
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itttititit Twryll ε+γ+γ−γ+γ+γ+γ= − 5432110 ,    (1) 
 
where itl  is (log) employment in firm i  at time t , ity  is real output, tr  the (real) rental cost of capital, 
tw  real wages and T  a time trend to control for (Hicks-neutral) technical progress.12 How variables are 
measured and constructed is described in Appendix 2.  The speed of adjustment is negatively related to 
the persistency in time of labour demand ( 1γ ), and equal to ( 11 γ− ). The extent of the adjustment is 
measured by the elasticity with respect to output ( 2γ ) and factor prices ( 3γ  and 4γ ). The effect of 
technical progress is captured by the coefficient 5γ . To account for unobservable components at the 
firm level we estimate equation (1) in first differences.13 
To test whether labour demand parameters are significantly different between MNEs and NEs, 
we introduce a dummy variable mne , which is 1 when the firm is owned by a foreign MNE and 0 
otherwise. This dummy is interacted with the explanatory variables so as to derive different sets of 
coefficients for the two types of firms:14 After re-expressing equation (1) in first differences we obtain: 
 
 
itiitiitiiti
itiititititit
mnewmnermneymne
lmnewryll
µγγγγ
γγγγγγ
++∆−∆+∆+
∆++∆−∆+∆+∆=∆ −−
10987
16543211  (2) 
 
Note that the MNE status of firms (the mne  dummy) may be capturing also the effect of other factors 
(mainly industry or size). For this reason, we have introduced size and sector controls by interacting j, 
j=1,2,…,J, size classes and k, k=1,2,…,K, sector dummies with the trend term as follows: 15  
 
itiitiitiitiiti
K
k
k
S
k
J
ij
j
D
jititititit
mnewmnermneymnelmne
SectDimwryll
νγγγγγ
γγγγγγγ
++∆−∆+∆+∆+
+++∆−∆+∆+∆=∆
−
==
− ∑∑
1098716
1
55543211 . (3) 
                                                 
12 Note that in equation (1) labour and capital earnings are expressed in real terms, by using industry-level producer price 
indexes as deflators (see Appendix 2). We do not include in the equation the (real) prices for other inputs (intermediates, 
materials, energy...) assuming they are closely correlated with industry-level producer price indexes.  
13 It is known that that using differenced variables aggravates measurement errors. The use of long time differences (5 years 
or more) attenuates the problem (Griliches and Hausman (1986)). In our case, however, this strategy would have implied a 
very severe reduction in the number of observations. 
14A similar methodology can also be found in Bruno, Falzoni and Helg (2002), a paper examining the effects of trade 
integration and MNEs on sectoral labour demands. 
15 As for size, a fivefold partition is used: up to 100, 100-250, 250-500, 500-1000 and above 1000 employees. As for sectors, 
the following partition is used, based on Pavitt’s classification: two supplier dominated sectors, two scale-intensive sectors, 
one specialised supplier sector and one science-based sector.  
Controls have also been carried out by interacting all variables with size and sectoral dummies. Results are in general robust, 
particularly to the inclusion of size dummies. However, when all potential interactions are introduced, the number of 
coefficients increases remarkably and the interpretation becomes harder. For this reason, these results are not reported.  
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OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent if the lagged variable is correlated with the error 
term, as it is frequent in dynamic panels with a short time dimension. Equation (3) is therefore 
estimated by using the GMM estimators proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).  
 
 Table 2 reports the econometric results separately for the eleven sample countries. Coefficients 
2γ , 3γ  and 4γ  are short-run output and factor price elasticities of labour demand for NEs. They all 
have the expected sign, they are generally significant, and their values fall in ranges generally thought as 
admissible (Hamermesh (1993)). Coefficients 7γ , 8γ  and 9γ  capture the difference in these elasticities 
between MNEs and NEs. These interacted terms are mostly not significant. This implies that short-run 
output and factor price elasticities are not significantly different between MNEs and NEs. The 
exceptions are Denmark, Spain and France where wage elasticities of MNEs (given by 94 γγ + ) are 
smaller (in absolute values). The coefficient 1γ  measures the persistence of labour demand for national 
firms, which as expected is for all countries smaller than one. The coefficient 6γ  measures the 
difference of persistence between national and multinational firms, and is always negative and 
significant. The fact that the sum ( )61 γ+γ  is very close to 0 for all countries means that MNEs adjust 
their labour demands almost fully within a year, and do that significantly faster than national firms.  
Summing up, we find that short-run wage and output elasticities are in the expected ranges and 
that they do not differ significantly between MNEs and NEs. In contrast, we find that MNEs adjust 
within one year to shocks affecting labour demand, much faster than national firms. Given the 
difference in the speed of adjustment of labour demands between NEs and MNEs it is important to 
compare the two groups of firms in terms of their long term elasticities. These are discussed in the next 
section.  
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Table 2 : Econometric results Dependent variable itl  - sample period 1994-2000 
 Belgium Denmark Spain Finland France Germany Italy 
The 
Netherlan
ds 
Norway Sweden United Kingdom
 N. of obs. 2471 479 2058 280 7739 1239 5203 913 1164 1664 17957 
 N. of  firms 493 225 679 124 2219 313 1194 224 410 922 3749 
            ( )1γ  0.908*** 0.679* 0.643*** 0.217 0.313*** 0.476* 0.410*** 0.768* 0.153** 0.449 0.871*** 
1−itl  (0.211) (0.381) (0.132) (0.237) (0.053) (0.280) (0.074) (0.407) (0.046) (0.153) (0.078) 
( )6γ   -0.708*** -0.751* -0.625*** -0.246 -0.318*** -0.394 -0.411*** -0.632 -0.127* -0.456 -0.787***
1−⋅ itlmne  (0.216) (0.387) (0.133) (0.238) (0.061) (0.286) (0.078) (0.410) (0.074) (0.161) (0.081) 
( )4γ  -0.533*** -0.737*** -1.056*** -0.416 -0.909*** -0.881*** -0.961*** -0.583*** -0.751*** -0.310* -0.459***
itw  (0.114) (0.147) (0.137) (0.307) (0.055) (0.157) (0.117) (0.152) (0.067) (0.161) (0.058) 
( )9γ  0.083 0.306** 0.321** -0.128 0.180** 0.170 0.060 0.110 0.068 -0.7190 0.024 
itwmne ⋅  (0.122) (0.151) (0.152) (0.275) (0.074) (0.163) (0.120) (0.165) (0.103) (0.175) (0.080) 
( )2γ  0.196** 0.612*** 0.311*** 0.496*** 0.639*** 0.680*** 0.596*** 0.512*** 0.375*** 0.511*** 0.519*** 
ity  (0.073) (0.081) (0.078) (0.086) (0.040) (0.109) (0.070) (0.119) (0.091) (0.078) (0.046) 
( )7γ  0.135 -0.192** 0.296** -0.103 -0.065 -0.119 0.132 -0.070 0.071 0.140 0.014 
itymne ⋅  (0.093) (0.090) (0.095) (0.132) (0.056) (0.135) (0.087) (0.129) (0.111) (0.127) (0.055) 
( )3γ  0.215** -0.007 0.185** -0.025 0.226*** 0.196** 0.320*** 0.177 0.183** 0.019 -0.031 
itr  (0.104) (0.190) (0.081) (0.132) (0.039) (0.081) (0.056) (0.138) (0.079) (0.137) (0.037) 
( )8γ  -0.122 -0.148 -0.035 0.097 0.002 -0.209* 0.000 -0.042 -0.238* 0.098 -0.040 
itrmne ⋅  (0.099) (0.160) (0.048) (0.165) (0.026) (0.077) (0.032) (0.138) (0.126) (0.163) (0.033) 
( )5γ  -0.059*** -0.037 -0.080 0.010 -0.031*** 0.016 -0.048** -0.019 -0.010 -0.016 -0.021** 
T  (0.015) (0.028) (0.117) (0.040) (0.008) (0.024) (0.016) (0.024) (0.050) (0.020) (0.009) 
( )10γ  0.002 0.030 0.021** 0.004 0.009** -0.041** 0.021* 0.004 -0.001 -0.012 0.019*** 
Tmne ⋅  (0.009) (0.023) (0.013) (0.016) (0.004) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.004) 
AR1 0.008 0.145 0.0006 0.759 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.075 0.005 0.006 0.000 
AR2 0.317 0.369 0.918 0.245 0.811 0.627 0.180 0.514 0.551 0.676 0.989 
Sargan test 0.330 1.000 0.484 0.960 0.150 0.089 0.330 0.067 0.880 1.000 0.030 
Robust standard errors in parentheses - Time dummies and controls by size and sector included - GMM results are one-step 
estimates with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and test statistics - AR1 and AR2 are tests for first order and 
second order serial correlation, P-values are reported - Sargan is a test of the overidentifying restrictions for the GMM 
estimators, the P-values reported refer to the two-step GMM estimators. *** statistically significant at 99 percent confidence 
level; **  statistically significant at 95 percent confidence level; *  statistically significant at 90 percent confidence level 
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4. Adjustment costs, wage elasticities and national labour markets  
 
In Table 3 we summarise our main findings: MNEs exhibit a speed of adjustment that in many cases is 
undistinguishable from unity, whereas NEs have adjustment lags that are longer on average and with a 
much higher cross-country variation. Despite rather similar short-run (impact) wage elasticities, long- 
run values are considerably higher for NEs in almost all countries. Moreover, while long-run elasticities 
do not appear to vary much across countries in the case of MNEs (all values are in the range –0.45, -
0.9), the elasticities of national firms seem much more affected by country-level characteristics. A 
similar picture emerges when comparing short and long-run output elasticities.16  
 
Table 3 – Short-run and long-run wage and output elasticities  
 
 
Speed of 
adjustment 
short-run 
wage elast. 
long-run 
wage elast. 
Short-run 
Output elast. 
Long-run 
Output elast. 
 NE MNE NE MNE NE MNE NE MNE NE MNE 
Belgium 0.09 0.80 -0.53 -0.45 -5.77 -0.56 0.20 0.33 2.13 0.41 
Denmark 0.32 1.07 -0.74 -0.43 -2.30 -0.40 0.61 0.42 1.91 0.39 
Spain 0.36 0.98 -1.06 -0.73 -2.96 -0.75 0.31 0.61 0.87 0.62 
Finland 0.78 1.03 -0.42 -0.54 -0.53 -0.53 0.50 0.39 0.63 0.38 
France 0.69 1.00 -0.91 -0.73 -1.32 -0.73 0.64 0.57 0.93 0.57 
Germany 0.52 0.92 -0.88 -0.71 -1.68 -0.77 0.68 0.56 1.30 0.61 
Italy 0.59 1.00 -0.96 -0.90 -1.63 -0.90 0.60 0.73 1.01 0.73 
The Netherlands 0.23 0.86 -0.58 -0.47 -2.51 -0.55 0.51 0.44 2.21 0.51 
Norway 0.85 0.97 -0.75 -0.68 -0.89 -0.70 0.37 0.45 0.44 0.46 
Sweden 0.55 1.01 -0.31 -0.50 -0.56 -0.50 0.51 0.65 0.93 0.65 
United Kingdom 0.13 0.92 -0.46 -0.43 -3.55 -0.47 0.52 0.53 4.01 0.58 
Definition  
(see equation (3)) 11 γ−  611 γ−γ−  4γ  94 γ+γ 1
4
1 γ−
γ  
61
94
1 γ−γ−
γ+γ
2γ  72 γ+γ  
1
2
1 γ−
γ  
61
72
1 γ−γ−
γ+γ
Source: calculations on coefficients reported in Table 2 
 
The finding that MNEs have lower long-run wage elasticities can be rationalised in terms of the 
higher skill intensity of their work force. Skilled personnel generally cover important roles in a firm, and 
with time it cumulates specific human capital that is essential to the activities of the firm and that 
cannot be disposed of easily. Regrettably, we cannot control for the skill mix in our sample, but the 
finding that average labour cost per employee is invariably higher in MNEs, even after controlling for 
size and industry is consistent with the presumption that MNEs are relatively skill intensive.  
Lower adjustment costs are the dominant factor explaining MNEs` faster speed in adjusting 
employment at the desired levels. Adjustment costs, in turn, are related to hiring and firing costs, but 
procedural obstacles could also be relevant. Hiring costs are related to labour availability -- in terms of 
both skill levels and willingness to work -- while firing costs are related to the ease of dispose of 
unwanted employment (the degree of “labour market rigidity”). Procedural costs can also be due to 
                                                 
16 By imposing a unitary speed of adjustment to all enterprises (assumptions that work against NEs, because according to 
estimated coefficients in Table 2 in the short run they are off their labour demand curves), we have also used repeated cross 
section estimation as a robustness check. We find that MNEs and NEs are undistinguishable in the short run, and we take 
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state regulatory activity and union presence. Hiring and firing costs could be lower for MNEs because 
they can adjust employment by simply shifting employees from one subsidiary to another. Moreover, 
being MNEs relatively footloose and having a higher bargaining power (associated with the threat of 
shifting production to alternative locations), they may face fewer constraints than NEs with respect to 
government, political parties or unions. This would translate in general into lower procedural costs. The 
possibility of shifting employment across different locations in response to wage changes and the 
greater ability to bypass country-level labour market regulations may create an asymmetry in the 
behaviour of MNEs versus NEs not only in terms of the speed of employment adjustment, but also 
with respect to the extent of the desired adjustment. Thus, we expect that the same reasons that can 
explain lower adjustment costs of employment in MNEs would lead to higher wage elasticities in these 
firms, keeping equal the skill composition of employment.  
To find some empirical support to these arguments we have correlated the ratio of the long-run 
wage elasticities in MNEs and NEs to a set of alternative country-level proxies of labour market 
conditions. Hiring costs are proxied by the educational attainment in the population (source Barro and 
Lee (1993)), on the expectation that the higher the proportion of educated labour force, the lesser are 
the costs of recruiting a skilled labour force and the lower are hiring costs. The most used measures for 
labour market rigidities are the employment protection indicators obtained from OECD. The different 
aspects of labour market regulation are summarised in an “overall indicator of the strictness of 
employment protection legislation”, available for the period “late 90’s”.17 It is not immediate to think of 
proxies for procedural inconvenience. We have considered the “overall indicator of product market 
regulation” (from Nicoletti, Scarpetta and Boylaud (2000)) and measures of union presence (from 
Checchi and Lucifora (2002)).18 
Cross-country correlations between the ratio of long-run wage elasticities for NEs and MNEs 
and labour market indicators are reported in Table 4. Figure 1 reports plots of this ratio on selected 
labour market indicators. From the correlation of the ratio of wage elasticities with the share of 
population with college degree it emerges that the relative long-run wage elasticity in MNEs is 
positively affected by the availability of skilled labour. This evidence gives indirect support to the view 
that the structure of employment is more skill-intensive in MNEs. As hiring and firing skilled personnel 
is less costly when skilled labour is relatively abundant, skill intensive firms like MNEs tend to have a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
this as reinforcing the result that the main difference is not in the short run adjustment (either wage or output elasticities), 
but in their speeds of adjustment. 
17 With respect to regular employment, OECD introduce the variable “overall strictness of protection against dismissal for 
regular employment”, obtained as weighed average of “regular procedural inconvenience”, “notice and severance pay for 
no-fault individual dismissals” and “difficulty of dismissal”. We also tested “overall strictness of regulation for temporary 
work” (weighed average of “fixed-term contracts” and “temporary work agency”) and “overall strictness of collective 
dismissal”. The overall indicator of the strictness of employment protection legislation is a weighed average of these three 
indicators. All these scores range from 0 to 6, with higher values representing stricter regulation. 
18 The indicator of product market regulation summarises information on “State control”, “Barriers to entrepreneurship”, 
“Barriers to trade and investment”, “Economic regulation” and “Administrative regulation”; data are referred to 1998.  
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relatively higher wage elasticity (see also the first quadrant of Figure 1). With respect to firing costs, 
correlation analysis shows that the relative wage elasticity of MNEs tends to rise with measures of 
rigidity of employment protection. This is easily understood by looking at the second quadrant of 
Figure 1: in countries characterised by stricter employment protection (e.g., Italy and France) the 
relative wage elasticity in MNEs is quite high (but still less than one), while in countries with more 
flexible labour markets (e.g., the UK) the wage elasticity in MNEs is considerably smaller than that in 
NEs. This confirms that MNEs are somehow in a better position to bypass country-specific regulations 
concerning employment protection. Similar arguments apply to product market regulation, which is 
also positively associated with relative wage elasticity (third quadrant of Figure 1). We also record a 
positive correlation between relative wage elasticity and union density, suggesting that MNEs are 
somehow able to counteract union power in countries where union are relevant (as measured by total 
union membership – see fourth quadrant of Figure 1). 
 
Table 4 – Cross- country correlation indices between relative wage elasticities  
and proxies for labour market institutions – 11 countries – 1994-2000 
 
 
 
Ratio of long-run 
wage elasticity 
(MNE/NE) 
Population share with college degree 0.3574 
OECD overall rigidity indicator 0.3263 
OECD strictness of protection for regular employment 0.4090 
OECD strictness of protection for temporary 
employment 
0.2149 
OECD overall product market regulation 0.3914 
Wage bargaining centralisation 0.1324 
Union net density 0.4508 
Definition (see equation (3)) ( )( ) ( )6194
14
1/
1/
γ−γ−γ+γ
γ−γ  
 
Note: Wage elasticities are considered in absolute terms 
Source: calculations on coefficients reported in Table 3 
 
Overall, we can summarise our results as follows. MNEs are characterised by lower wage 
elasticity in the long run, irrespective of the country considered. While the wage elasticity in MNEs 
does not show much variation across countries, that in NEs seems more affected by country-level 
characteristics. Cross-country correlation analysis shows that the relative long-run wage elasticities in 
MNEs tend to rise with measures of skill availability, employment protection, product market 
regulation and union presence. This indicates that country-specific labour market regulations that tend 
to limit the capacity of firms to adjust employment (thus reducing labour demand wage elasticties) have 
a relatively smaller impact on MNEs. This evidence is consistent with the view that multinational firms, 
being relatively footloose and having greater bargaining power vis-à-vis host-countries’ authorities and 
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labour representatives, are in a better to position to bypass regulations affecting employment 
adjustment than purely national firms. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
It is often argued that MNEs face lower costs than NEs in hiring and firing labour. As a consequence, 
they are expected to respond to shocks in technology, output and factor prices by adjusting their labour 
demand faster and to a greater extent than NEs. This paper examines if this is the case, by estimating 
dynamic labour demands for the two types of firms in elevan European countries.  
In line with general beliefs, we find that MNEs adjust labour demands faster than NEs in all the 
sample countries.  Within a year they achieve their optimal labour demand, whereas national firms take 
longer. In contrast, the extent of the adjustment is more limited: MNEs have generally smaller (in 
absolute terms) factor price and output long-run elasticities than NEs. We attribute the lower elasticities 
of MNEs to the higher skill intensity of their work force, although this cannot be directly measured in 
our database. Indirect evidence of this effect can nevertheless be derived from educational attainments 
in the total population and from average labour costs. Conditional on lower elasticity, MNEs enjoy a 
greater flexibility in employment adjustment with respect to NEs when labour and product markets are 
strictly regulated and/or unions are more powerful.  
Our results address some of the worries emerging in the debate on the role of MNEs. Although 
MNEs create and destroy jobs faster than NEs, they are able to adjust more smoothly to shocks 
affecting their labour demands. For any given wage increase, for example, in the longer run MNEs 
reduce total employment less than national firms. In a sense, average jobs in MNEs are “safer” than in 
NEs. Also, we find that labour market regulations are quite irrelevant to the labour market behaviour of 
MNEs. These firms appear to be able to reach their optimal labour demand at fast speed independently 
of the labour market regime, and their long-run wage elasticity shows little variation across countries. 
Thus, concerns that labour market regulation may scare away foreign direct investments seem ill placed. 
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APPENDIX 1: Nationals vs. Multinationals: summary statistics for the firms in the samplea (1998) 
  Average 
employment 
per firm (units) 
Average output 
per employee  
(000 US $)b 
Average labour cost 
per employee  
(000 US $) 
Belgium NE 214.58 (310.02) 274.92 (262.56) 43.46 (17.49) 
 MNE 535.24 (1083.47) 333.9 (299.92) 54.97 (15.04) 
 National averagec  189.18 33.27 
Denmark NE 323.38 (446.86) 215.45 (194.23) 44.49 (9.43) 
 MNE 236.72 (213.33) 216.82 (124.07) 47.63 (10.23) 
 National averaged  160.24 40.69 
Spain NE 274.48 (872.54) 238.56 (283.82) 30.21 (10.81) 
 MNE 441.73 (988.09) 307.12 (232.38) 41.06 (14.03) 
 National averagec  n.a. n.a. 
Finland NE 323.4 (348.34) 245.19 (158.49) 42.52 (9.42) 
 MNE 230.34 (223.09) 246.47 (140.73) 42.61 (8.76) 
 National averagec  156.71 27.05 
France NE 496.51 (1896.10) 243.44 (299.85) 41.91 (14.57) 
 MNE 354.92 (519.63) 271.03 (244.04) 46.23 (14.21) 
 National averagec  155.86 30.16 
Germany NE 1731.55 (4075.65) 309.07 (201.43) 60.61 (20.04) 
 MNE 1626.71 (2012.65) 453.07 (773.92) 63.33 (20.63) 
 National averagec  119.39 30.94 
Italy NE 213.82 (633.30) 223.67 (143.20) 34.82 (9.94) 
 MNE 419.75 (722.81) 385.04 (454.61) 45.27 (13.54) 
 National averagec  109.82 19.19 
Netherlands NE 2162.71 (5114.76) 339.87 (321.39) 47.71 (12.42) 
 MNE 1046.71 (2969.12) 381.24 (297.20) 49.77 (10.77) 
 National averagec  145.30 25.72 
Norway NE 133.36 (231.28) 157.37 (162.83) 34.92 (12.97) 
 MNE 189.01 (217.94) 228.79 (159.35) 50.26 (13.79) 
 National averagec  n.a. n.a. 
Sweden NE 285.98 (803.16) 195.94 (144.05) 29.64 (5.57) 
 MNE 408.17 (671.10) 239.16 (187.39) 32.59 (5.76) 
 National averagec  200.52 40.26 
United  NE 529.93 (2305.81) 169.87 (213.94) 31.70 (10.43) 
Kingdom MNE 495.91 (1244.04) 232.72 (397.37) 35.44 (12.92) 
 National averagec  147.04 38.02 
aStandard deviations into brackets;  
bOutput is proxied by operating revenue (000 US$);  
cSource: OECD STAN Database, OECD, Paris, 2001 
 
APPENDIX 2: Description of the variables used in the estimations 
 
Variable Description 
itl  Number of employees
a 
itw  Real labour costs
a,b 
ity  Real operating revenue
a,b 
itr  Real rental cost of capital 
)1
/
1log(
1
−+=
−itit
t
t PP
ir  
where ti =country-level nominal interest ratec and itP =industry-
level price indexb 
 
a Source: Amadeus Database, 2001. 
b Deflators are industry-level (SIC 2 digits) producer price indexes. Source: OECD, STAN database, OECD, Paris, 2001. 
c Source for country-level nominal interest rates: IMF, International Financial Statistics, IMF, Washington DC, 2000. 
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Figure 1 
Relative long run wage elasticities and labour market variables
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